Abstract. In this paper we study the zero-sum and nonzero-sum differential games with not assuming Isaacs condition. Along with the partition π of the time interval [0, T ], we choose the suitable random non-anticipative strategy with delay to study our differential games with asymmetric information. Using Fenchel transformation, we prove that the limits of the upper value function W π and lower value function V π coincide when the mesh of partition π tends to 0. Moreover, we give a characterization for the Nash equilibrium payoff (NEP, for short) of our nonzero-sum differential games without Isaacs condition, then we prove the existence of the NEP of our games. Finally, by considering all the strategies along with all partitions, we give a new characterization for the value of our zero-sum differential game with asymmetric information under some equivalent Isaacs condition.
Introduction
Zero-sum stochastic differential games have developed rapidly since the pioneering work [8] by Fleming and Souganidis after they firstly introduced the Isaacs condition and characterized the value of these games as a viscosity solution of some Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation. Hamadène and Lepeltier in [9] characterized the value of zero-sum stochastic differential game as a solution of some backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE, for short) under the equivalent Isaacs condition. Cardaliaguet in [5] studied the zero-sum differential game with asymmetric information under the Isaacs condition and characterized the value of this game as a dual solution of some Hamilton-Jacobi equation.
On the other hand, nonzero-sum differential games with Isaacs condition have been studied by many authors. When playing "control against control", Hamadène, Lepeltier and Peng in f (X r , u r , v r )dr, s ∈ [t, T ], (1.1) where u and v are stochastic processes taking value in compact U and V , respectively, f : R n × U × V → R n is bounded, Lipschitz in x, uniformly in (u, v). For any fixed partition π of time interval [0, T ], we give a generalized defintion of non-anticipative strategy with delay along this partition π (see, Def. 2.1) which has the property that: for any partitions π 1 and π 2 with"π 1 ⊂ π 2 " (the partition points of π 2 contain all of the partition points of π 1 ), it holds the strategy set A π 1 (t, T ) ⊂ A π 2 (t, T ) for Player I; similarly, we have that for Player II. Along with the partition π, we define the upper and lower value functions W π (t, x, p, q) and V π (t, x, p, q) (more details see Section 2) for our zero-sum differential game with asymmetric. In Section 3, we firstly show that the upper and lower value function W π and V π defined by the strategy from A π (t, T ) and B π (t, T ) are just the upper and lower value function W π 1 and V π 1 defined by the strategy from A π 1 (t, T ) and B π 1 (t, T ) which is the subset of A π (t, T ) and B π (t, T ), respectively. Then, with the help of Fenchel transform, we prove a sub-dynamic programming principle (sub-DPP, for short) for the conjugate functions of W π and V π , then we show that W π and V π converge to the same function U as the mesh of π tends to 0 without Isaacs condition. Moreover, this value U can be characterized as the unique dual viscosity solution of the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation ∂V ∂t (t, x) + H(x, DV (t, x)) = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n , V (T, x) = i,j p i q j g ij (x), (p, q) ∈ ∆(I) × ∆(J), (1.2) where H(x, ξ) = inf µ∈P(U ) sup ν∈P(V ) U ×V f (x, u, v)µ(du)ν(dv) · ξ .
In Section 4, we mainly consider the nonzero-sum differential game with symmetric information (i.e., I = J = 1) and without Isaac condition. Inspired by the definition of NEP used in [1] , we introduce a new definition of NEP for our nonzero-sum differential games. Using the value function U that we find in Section 3, we show a characterization for our NEP. Furthermore, we prove the existence of the NEP for our nonzero-sum differential games without Isaacs condition using this characterization.
In Section 5, we give a characterization for the value function U (found in Section 3) of our zerosum differential games with asymmetric information. With the property that A π 1 (t, T ) ⊂ A π 2 (t, T ) if "π 1 ⊂ π 2 ", we can consider the strategies in A(t, T ) where A(t, T ) is the union of the A π (t, T ) with all the partitions π for Player I, similarly that for Player II. Then we show that the upper and lower value function W (t, x, p, q), V (t, x, p, q) defined by the strategies from A(t, T ) and B(t, T ) coincide with the value function U (t, x, p, q) which is the unique dual viscosity solution of HamiltonJacobi-Isaac equation (1.2) under some equivalent Isaacs condition. Therefore, we also provide a new numerical method for calculating the value of the zero-sum differential game with asymmetric information. At last, we give an example to illustrate that the equivalent Isaacs condition is necessary.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give some introduction about the dynamic and the strategies for our games. Section 3 is devoted to proving the existence of the value of our zero-sum differential game with asymmetric information and without Isaacs condition. In Section 4 we prove the existence of the Nash equilibrium payoffs of our nonzero-sum differential game with symmetric information and without Isaacs condition. Finally, we give a characterization for the value of the zero-sum differential games under some equivalent Isaacs condition in Section 5.
Preliminaries
Let (Ω, F, P ) be the canonical Wiener space, that is, Ω is the set of continuous functions from [0, T ] to R 2 , F is the completed σ-algebra on Ω, P is the Wiener measure. We define the canonical process B t (ω) = (B 1 t (ω), B 2 t (ω)) = (ω 1 (t), ω 2 (t)), t ∈ [0, T ], ω = (ω 1 , ω 2 ) ∈ Ω. Then B is a 2-dimensional Brownian motion on (Ω, F, P ) and B 1 is independent of B 2 . We denote by {F t,s , s ≥ t} the filtration generated by the Brownian motion B, where F t,s = σ{B r − B t , r ∈ [t, s]} ∨ N , N is the set of null-set of P .
For any given partition π = {0 = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t N = T } of the interval [0, T ], we define random variables ζ π i,j = Φ 0,1 ( 2 }dy, x ∈ R. Obviously, {ζ π i,j } 1≤j≤N, i = 1, 2, is a family of independent random variables with uniform distribution on [0, 1] . Let U and V be the compact metric spaces which are the control state spaces used by Player I and II, respectively. Let P(U ) and P(V ) be the space of all probability measures over U and V , respectively. From Skorohod's Representation Theorem, P(U ) (resp., P(V )) coincides with the set of the distributions of all U -valued (resp., V -valued) random variables. Now we introduce the admissible controls for both players.
For any t ∈ [0, T ], the U -valued and Lebesgue measurable functions (u s ) s∈ [t,T ] form the set of admissible controls for Player I, the V -valued and Lebesgue measurable functions (v s ) s∈[t,T ] that for Player II. We denote by U t,T the set of admissible controls (u s ) s∈[t,T ] for Player I and by V t,T the set of admissible controls (v s ) s∈[t,T ] for Player II.
For any given t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ R n , we consider the following ordinary differential equation
where u ∈ U t,T and v ∈ V t,T , and the coefficient f : R n × U × V → R n is supposed to be bounded, continuous with respect to (u, v) and Lipschitz continuous in x, uniformly with respect to u and v. Therefore, equation (2.1) has a unique solution and we denote it by X t,x,u,v . From standard estimates we obtain that there exists a constant C > 0 such that, for all (t, x),
Definition 2.1. A random non-anticipative strategy with delay (NAD, for short) along the partition π for Player I is a mapping α :
where
Similarly, a random NAD strategy along the partition π for Player II is a mapping β : Ω × [t, T ] × U t,T → V t,T of the form
For all u, u ′ ∈ U t,T , it holds that, whenever u = u ′ a.e. on [t, t l−1 ], we have for all ω ∈ Ω, for all
The set of all such random NAD strategies for Player I along the partition π is denoted by A π (t, T ), and similarly B π (t, T ) is that for Player II, A π 0 (t, T ) and B π 0 (t, T ) are the sets of pure (i.e. deterministic) strategies for player I and II. Then, we know for any partitions π, π ′ of interval [t, T ] with π ⊂ π ′ , it holds A π (t, T ) ⊂ A π ′ (t, T ). Moreover we define
Obviously, from the Definition 2.1 and 2.2 we know
From the definition of a NAD strategy, we get the following lemma which is crucial throughout the paper. Such a result was established the first time by Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer [1] , Lemma 2.4. Lemma 2.1. For any α ∈ A(t, T ) and β ∈ B(t, T ), there exists a unique measurable mapping
A proof of Lemma 2.1 for a similar context can be found in [6] . However, since our framework is slightly more general, for the reader's convenience we prefer to give it here.
Proof. For any α ∈ A(t, T ), from (2.3) we know there exist a partition π 1 of interval [0, T ], such that α ∈ A π 1 (t, T ). Similarly, there exist a partition π 2 of interval [0, T ], such that β ∈ B π 2 (t, T ). Define π = π 1 ∪ π 2 which combines π 1 and π 2 , and notice that then α ∈ A π (t, T ), and β ∈ B π (t, T ).
Indeed, if, for example, π = {0 = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t N = T } and t l−1 , t l+1 ∈ π 1 , but t l / ∈ π 1 , then for [t l−1 , t l+1 ] as j-th subinterval of the partition π 1 , ζ
i,j is a measurable function of (ζ π i,l , ζ π i,l+1 ), i = 1, 2. The above situation can be extended into an obvious manner to the general case π 1 ⊂ π and allows to show that A π 1 (t, T ) ⊂ A π (t, T ).
] is empty or a singleton, from the property of delay we know α(ω, v), β(ω, u) restricted to [t, t k ] do not depend on v and u. Then we can define u 1 ω = α(ω, v 0 ),
, for any v 0 ∈ V t,T and u 0 ∈ U t,T , and the mapping
Now we assume that for j ≥ 2, α(ω, v
ω , a.e. on [t, t j+k−2 ], and
. From the property of delay, we have α(ω, v
is measurable. Consequently, we get the existence of the measurable mapping Ω ∋ ω → (u ω , v ω ) ∈ U t,T × V t,T satisfying this lemma and the uniqueness is obvious from the above construction.
Remark 2.1. This lemma implies that, for any partition π of [0, T ]: For any α ∈ A π (t, T ), β ∈ B π (t, T ), but also for any α ∈ A(t, T ), β ∈ B π (t, T ), and for any α ∈ A π (t, T ), β ∈ B(t, T ), there exists the unique mapping
Remark 2.2. The control processes u and v along the partition π satisfying Lemma 2.1 have the following form:
We denoted by U π t,T and V π t,T the set of the processes u and v, respectively, which have the above forms. The corresponding controls set constructed by A π 1 (t, T ) and B π 1 (t, T ) we denoted by U π,1 t,T and V π,1 t,T . The only difference between U π t,T and U
Now we define the following upper value functions and lower value functions, respectively,
Definition 2.3. Let ε > 0, we say thatα ∈ (A π (t, T )) I is an ε-optimal randomized strategy for
We say thatβ ∈ (B π (t, T )) J is an ε-optimal randomized strategy for V π (t, x, p, q), if for all
Similarly, we define ε-optimal strategies for the other upper and lower value functions.
3 The functions W π (t, x, p, q) and V π (t, x, p, q) without Isaacs condition
In this section we mainly prove that when the mesh of the partition π tends to 0, the functions W π and V π converge uniformly to the same function which is the unique dual solution of some Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI, for short) equation. For this, we introduce the following functions:
We only give the proof for V π (t, x, p, q) = V π 1 (t, x, p, q), the proof for W π (t, x, p, q) = W π 1 (t, x, p, q) is similar. In order to show that, we need the following auxiliary lower value function:
we know H is the Cameron-Martin space. For any h ∈ H, we define the mapping τ h : Ω → Ω by τ h (ω) := ω + h, ω ∈ Ω. Then, we know τ h is a bijection and τ
For any α ∈ A π (t, T ), we know α has the form of
Then, for any h ∈ H, we define
Obviously, we know α h ∈ A π (t, T ), and the mapping α → α h is a bijection on A π (t, T ). For any h ∈ H, β ∈ B π (t, T ), β h is similarly defined and β → β h is a bijection on B π (t, T ). Then we get
We now define I(t, x, p, q,β) := essinf
, P -a.s., from (3.4) we get
On the other hand, for any random variable ξ, such that ξ ≤
we know ξ • τ −h ≤ I(t, x, p, q,β), P -a.s., which means that ξ ≤ I(t, x, p, q,β) • τ h . Thus we have
Using the similar method, we obtain
Therefore, for all h ∈ H, from (3.7) and (3.6) we get, P -a.s.,
Then combined with Lemma 4.1 in [2] , we obtain our desired results.
Now we give the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof.
Step 1:
For any ε > 0, there existsα ∈ (A π (t, T )) I (depending on ε,β), such that
From Lemma 3.1 and (3.9), we havẽ
(3.10)
Since (3.10) holds for anyβ ∈ (B π 1 (t, T )) J , we get
From the arbitrariness of ε, we obtainṼ π (t, x, p, q) ≥ V π 1 (t, x, p, q). On the other hand, for any ε > 0, there existsβ ∈ (B π (t, T )) J , such that, P -a.s.,
(3.12)
From the arbitrariness of ε, we obtainṼ π (t, x, p, q) ≤ V π 1 (t, x, p, q).
For any ε > 0, there existsα ∈ (A π (t, T )) I , such that, P -a.s.,
(3.14)
From Lemma 3.1 and (3.14), we havẽ
(3.15)
Thanks to (3.15) holds for anyβ ∈ (B π (t, T )) J and from the arbitrariness of ε, we haveṼ π (t, x, p, q) ≥ V π (t, x, p, q). On the other hand, for any ε > 0, there existsβ ∈ (B π (t, T )) J , such that, P -a.s.,
(3.16)
From Lemma 3.1, thanks to (3.16) holds for everyα ∈ (A π (t, T )) I , we havẽ
Thus, we obtainṼ π (t, x, p, q) ≤ V π (t, x, p, q). Finally, from Step 1 and Step 2, we have
We now prove that when the mesh of the partition π tends to 0, the functions W π 1 and V π 1 converge uniformly to the same function which is the unique dual solution of some HJI equation.
Lemma 3.2. The functions W π 1 and V π 1 are Lipschitz continuous with respect to (t, x, p, q), uniformly with respect to π.
Proof. We just give the proof for V π 1 , the proof of W π 1 is similar. Since the cost functionals g ij are bounded, from the definition of V π 1 , we obviously have that V π 1 is Lipschitz with respect to p and q. For any
) is Lipschitz continuous with respect to x, then for any (α,β) ∈ (A π 1 (t, T )) I ×(B π 1 (t, T )) J , we have that J(t, x,α,β, p, q) is Lipschitz continuous with respect to x. Moreover, the Lipschitz constant only depends on the Lipschitz constants of g ij and the bound of f . Thus we have V π 1 is Lipschitz with respect to x. Now we only need to show V π 1 is Lipschitz with respect to t. Let x ∈ R n , (p, q) ∈ ∆(I) × ∆(J), and t < t ′ < T be arbitrarily fixed. Letβ = (β j ) j=1,2,...,J ∈ (B π 1 (t, T )) J be an ε-optimal strategy for V π 1 (t, x, p, q). We define a strategy β ′ j ∈ B π 1 (t ′ , T ) associated with β j . For this end, we put for all u ∈ U t ′ ,T ,β
andū ∈ U is an arbitrarily given constant control.
If t ′ < t k , thenβ j ∈ B π 1 (t ′ , T ) and we define β ′ j =β j . Otherwise, we let l ≥ k + 1 be such that
, which are mutually independent, independent of ζ π i,j , (i, j) = (2, l − 1), and uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Then the composed random variables
Now for any α ∈ A π 1 (t ′ , T ), we define a strategy α ′ ∈ A π 1 (t, T ) associated with α as follows, for all v ∈ V t,T ,
Through the above construction and from Lemma 2.1, the couples of admissible controls related to the couples of strategies (α ′ , β j ) and (α,β j ) coincide on the interval [t ′ , T ]. Hence, using the standard estimate and Gronwall inequality we have
where the constant M only depends on the bound of f as well as the Lipschitz constant of f . Thus, for anyα ∈ (A π 1 (t ′ , T )) I , from (3.18), (3.19) and (2.9), we have
Similarly, if we assume thatβ ∈ (B π 1 (t ′ , T )) J is ε-optimal for V π 1 (t ′ , x, p, q), then we can get
Moreover, from the arbitrariness of ε > 0, we obtain V π 1 is Lipschitz continuous in t.
Lemma 3.3. For any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n , the functions W π 1 (t, x, p, q) and V π 1 (t, x, p, q) both are convex in p and concave in q on ∆(I) and ∆(J).
Proof. We just give the proof for V π 1 , the proof of W π 1 is similar. It is obvious that
Without loss of generality, we assume q λ j > 0, j = 1, . . . , J, then we define c j =
Thanks to the arbitrariness of ε, we obtain the desired result.
Now we introduce the Fenchel transforms (refer to [5] ). Assume a mapping ψ : [0, T ] × R n × ∆(I) × ∆(J) → R convex in p and concave in q on ∆(I) and ∆(J), respectively, then we define its convex conjugate (with respect to variable p) ψ * by
and its concave conjugate (with respect to variable q) ψ # by
Using these notations we denote by V π * 1 (W π# 1 ) for the convex (respectively, concave) conjugate of V π 1 (respectively, W π 1 ) with respect to p (respectively, q).
Proof. We define
It is obviously that F (t, x,p, q) is convex with respect top. From (3.24) and (3.27), we have
where we define
On the other hand,
From (3.28), (3.29) and (3.22), we get
Since F is convex inp, we have V π * 1 = F * * = F .
Using the definition of V π * 1 and W π# 1 , from Lemma 3.2 we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5. For all the partition π of the interval [0, T ], the convex conjugate function V π * 1 (t, x,p, q) is Lipschitz with respect to (t, x,p, q), the concave conjugate function W π# 1 (t, x, p,q) is Lipschitz with respect to (t, x, p,q).
Generally speaking, the game with asymmetric information does not have the dynamic programming principle, but it has s sub-dynamic programming principle.
For any given ε > 0, let β 0 ∈ B π 1 (t, t l ) be an ε-optimal strategy for G(t, t l , x,p, q), i.e.,
For any y ∈ R n , there exists an ε-optimal strategyβ y = (β
and V π * 1 (t l , y,p, q) are Lipschitz continuous with respect to y,β y is a (2ε)-optimal strategies for V π * 1 (t l , z,p, q), if z ∈ B r (y), where B r (y) is the ball with small enough radius r.
Since the coefficient f is bounded, there exists some R > 0 large enough such that all the value of X t,x,α,β t l belong to the ball B R (0). Then we assume (O n ), n = 1, . . . , n 0 , is a finite Borel partition of B R (0). For any x n ∈ O n , we denote β n j = β xn j , n = 1, . . . , n 0 , the strategy (β n j ) is (2ε)-optimal for V π * 1 (t l , z,p, q), for any z ∈ O n , i.e.,
For any ω ∈ Ω and u ∈ U t,T , we define
Then, we have β j ∈ B π 1 (t, T ). For any α ∈ A π 1 (t, T ), we know α has the following form: 
≤G(t, t l , x,p, q) + 3ε, (3.37) which means that V π * 1 (t, x,p, q) ≤ G(t, t l , x,p, q).
We assume (π n ) n≥1 is a sequence partitions of the interval [0, T ] satisfying that when n → ∞, the mesh of the partition |π n | tends to zero. From Lemma 3.5, applying the Arzelà-Ascoli Theorem to V πn * 1 (t, x,p, q) and W πn# 1 (t, x, p,q), we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.7. There exists a subsequence of partitions (π n ) n≥1 , still denoted by (π n ) n≥1 and two functionsṼ :
Remark 3.1. Notice that from Lemma 3.5, the limit functionsṼ andW are Lipschitz continuous with respect to all their variables. Now we prove that the limit functionsṼ andW are a viscosity subsolution and a viscosity supersolution of some HJI equation, respectively. For more details on viscosity solutions, the reader is referred to [7] .
Lemma 3.8. The limit functionṼ (t, x,p, q) is a viscosity subsolution of the following HJI equation
Proof. For simplicity, we denoteṼ (t, x,p, q) byṼ (t, x), for fixed (p, q) ∈ R I × ∆(J). For any fixed (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n , since the coefficient f is bounded, there is some M > 0 such that,
(the set of bounded continuous functions where the first order partial derivate is bounded and continuous) be a test function such that
, then there exists a subsequence of (s n , x n ) still denoted by (s n , x n ), such that (s n , x n ) converges to (t, x).
Indeed, since [0, T ] ×B M (x) is a compact set, there exists a subsequence (s n , x n ) and (s,x)
From (3.39) and (3.40), we have (s,x) = (t, x).
For the partition π n , we assume t n k n−1 ≤ s n < t n kn , for simplicity, we write t n k−1 ≤ s n < t n k . Since x n → x, there is a positive integer N such that for all n ≥ N , we have |x n − x| ≤ 1. Then from Lemma 3.6, we get
Thus we get
(3.42)
For (u, v) ∈ U t,T × V t,T , we introduce the following continuity modulus, 
(3.44)
It follows from (3.42) and (3.44) that
where we takeβ r =ṽ(ζ πn 2,k−1 ), r ∈ [s n , t n k ],ṽ is a V -valued measurable function. Define ρ n = (t n k − s n ) 2 , from (3.45) there exists a ρ n -optimal strategy α n (depending onβ) such that
(3.46)
Notice that on the interval [s n , t n k ], α n does not depend on the controlṽ due to the delay property. Then thanks to the independence between ζ 
From the arbitrariness ofṽ, from (3.47) we get
which means that
Now we want to proveW is a viscosity supersolution of the HJI equation (3.38) . Notice that
Then −W π 1 (t, x, p, q) has the same form as V π 1 , only change the role of players. Thus, the convex conjugate −W π 1 (t, x, p, q) with respect to q, i.e., −(W π# 1 (t, x, p, −q)) satisfies a sub-dynamic programming principle. Then similar to Lemma 3.6 and Theorem 3.8 we have the following result.
Lemma 3.9. For any (t, x, p,q) ∈ [0, T ] × R n × ∆(I) × R J , and for all l (k ≤ l ≤ n), we have
52)
andW (the limit of (W πn# 1
) on compacts) is a supersolution of the HJI equation (3.38).
We now give the definition of dual solutions for the following HJI equation
called a dual viscosity subsolution of the equation (3.53) if, firstly, w is Lipschitz continuous with all its variables, convex with respect
to p and concave with respect to q, secondly, for any (p,q) ∈ ∆(I) × R J , w # (t, x, p,q) is a viscosity supersolution of the dual HJI equation 
The proof of Lemma 3.10 is referred to Theorem 5.1 in [5] . For this we first prove the following proposition, then we get Theorem 3.2 directly. converges uniformly to the function (U, U ) and the limit U is the unique dual solution of the HJI equation (3.53) . Therefore, the limits of all converging sub-subsequences are the same, then Theorem 3.2 holds.
Now we prove (of Proposition 3.1).
Proof. From Lemma 3.2, using the Arzelà-Ascoli Theorem we know there exist two bounded Lipschitz functions V 1 and . We knowṼ * andW # are a dual viscosity supersolution and a dual viscosity subsolution of HJI equation (3.53), respectively, and the terminal valueṼ * (T, x, p, q) =W # (T, x, p, q) = ij p i q j g ij (x). Then from Lemma 3.10, we havẽ 
Thus, from the definition of convex conjugate we have
On the other hand, knowing that W
From (3.56) and (3.57), we know that U :
. Furthermore, from the above proof, we also know that U is the unique dual viscosity solution of HJI equation (3.53).
From Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2, we obtain the following result directly.
Theorem 3.3. The functions (V πn ) and (W πn ) converge uniformly on compacts to a same Lipschitz continuous function U when the mesh of the partition π n tends to 0. Moreover, the function U is the unique dual viscosity solution of the HJI equation (3.53).
Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum differential games with symmetric information and without Isaacs condition
In this section we consider the existence of Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum differential games with symmetric information (i.e., I = J = 1) and without Isaacs condition. From Theorem 3.1, we only need to consider the strategies α ∈ A π 1 (t, T ) and β ∈ B π 1 (t, T ) for our nonzero-sum games. Let g 1 : R n → R and g 2 : R n → R be two bounded Lipschitz continuous functions. For
t,T and V π,1 t,T refer to Remark 2.2), we define
where X t,x,u,v is the solution of the equation (2.1). From Remark 2.1, we know for any (α,
Here, for the nonzero-sum differential games Player I wants to maximize J 1 (t, x, α, β), while Player II wants to maximize J 2 (t, x, α, β). In general, a Nash equilibrium point is a couple strategies (ᾱ,β) such that for any other couples of strategies (α, β), it holds
and the pair (J 1 (t, x,ᾱ,β), J 2 (t, x,ᾱ,β)) is called a Nash equilibrium payoff. In our paper, we only concern the existence of the Nash equilibrium payoff which can be approximated by (J 1 (t, x,ᾱ ǫ ,β ǫ ), J 2 (t, x,ᾱ ǫ ,β ǫ )) when ǫ tends to 0. Now we first give the definition of a Nash equilibrium payoff for our nonzero-sum differential games. 
The following lemma gives an equivalent condition of assumption (4.3) which will be frequently used in this section.
T ). Assumption (4.3) holds if and only if for any
Proof. We assume (4.3) holds, then for any fixed u ∈ U π,1 t,T , we define α(v) ≡ u, for all v ∈ V π,1 t,T , then we know α ∈ A π 1 (t, T ). Thus, from condition (4.3), we have
Conversely now (4.5) holds, for any α ∈ A π 1 (t, T ), from Remark 2.2, there exists (u, v) ∈ U π,1
Similarly to J 2 , then we get condition (4.3).
From Theorem 3.2 we know the upper value function W π 1 and the lower value function V π 1 converge to the same function without Isaacs condition. Thus we can denote the following functions U 1 (t, x) and U 2 (t, x): 6) and similarly,
Now we announce the following two important results for our nonzero-sum differential games.
Theorem 4.1. (Characterization) A couple (e 1 , e 2 ) ∈ R 2 is a NEP at the position (t, x) if and only if for any ǫ > 0, there exists δ ǫ satisfying that for any partition π = {0 = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t N = T } with |π| < δ ǫ and t = t k−1 , there exists
t,T such that for i = k, . . . , N and m = 1, 2, respectively, 8) and
The rest of this section mainly gives the proof for the above theorems, we first prove Theorem 4.1 and then from this characterization, we prove the existence result (Theorem 4.2) . First of all, we give the following lemma which will be used to prove Theorem 4.1 and 4.2.
For any ǫ > 0, for any partition π = {0 = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t N = T } with |π| < δ ǫ (small enough) and t = t k−1 , any fixed u ′ ∈ U π,1 t,T , there exist strategies
Proof. We just give the proof for a), the proof of b) is analogous. For any ǫ > 0, y ∈ R n , any fixed i, from the definition of the value function U 2 , there exists a strategy α i y ∈ A π 1 (t i−1 , T ) such that
(4.12)
Since the coefficient f is bounded, for any (u, v) ∈ U π,1 t,T × V π,1 t,T , there exists a constant R > 0 such that |X t,x,u,v | ≤ R. Then there exists a finite partition (O l ) l=1,2,...,n of the closed ballB R (0) with diam(O l ) ≤ ǫ (4C). For any l, from (4.12) there is some y l ∈ O l with ∀z ∈ O l , sup 
where Q is a 2(i − k)-dimensional constant vector. Therefore, v ′′ ∈ V π,1 t i−1 ,T , and we define the following strategy α i ,
t,T from (4.13) we have, P -a.s., Now with the help of Lemma 4.2, we will prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof. Sufficient condition.
Let us assume that (e 1 , e 2 ) satisfies condition (4.8) and (4.9) of Theorem 4.1, namely, for any ǫ > 0, there exists δ ǫ small enough satisfying that for any partition π = {0 = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t N = T } with |π| < δ ǫ and t = t k−1 , there exists (u ǫ , v ǫ ) ∈ U π,1 t,T × V π,1 t,T such that for i = k, . . . , N and m = 1, 2,
and
Then we will prove that (e 1 , e 2 ) is a NEP for the initial position (t, x). For this, we construct 
. Now we define α ǫ as follows:
Taking expectation on both side we have
and the coefficient f is bounded, for ρ := |π| > 0, we have
Moreover, since U 2 (s, x) is Lipschitz in x, and S v ≤ τ v ≤ S v + ρ, then we have
From (4.24) and (4.25), we have
Now we denote
and from (4.18), we have P (Ω i ) ≥ 1 − ǫ 0 . Thus, from (4.26), (4.27) and (4.19), we have
. Then from (4.28) and (4.21) we obtain
Similarly, we can construct β ǫ ∈ B π 1 (t, T ) such that 
namely, we obtain (4.4). From (4.31) we know, for m = 1, 2, respectively,
From (4.29), (4.30) and (4.32), we have
From Lemma 4.1, we know (4.3) holds.
Necessary condition.
We assume there exists a NEP (e 1 , e 2 ) ∈ R 2 at the position (t, x), i.e., for any ǫ > 0, there exists δ ǫ small enough satisfying that for any partition π = {0 = t 0 < . . . < t N = T } with |π| < δ ǫ and t = t k−1 , there exists (α ǫ , β ǫ ) ∈ A π 1 (t, T ) × B π 1 (t, T ) be such that for any (u, v) ∈ U π,1 t,T × V π,1 t,T , the following inequalities hold:
and for m = 1, 2, respectively,
Now we see (4.9) holds obviously. We suppose (4.8) doesn't hold, then we assume that there is some j ∈ {k, . . . , N }, without loss of generality, we consider the case m = 1 such that
t,T , then there exist a strategy α ∈ A π 1 (t, T ) such that, for any v ∈ V π,1 t,T , α(v) = u ǫ , on [t, t j−1 ], P -a.s., and
. Defineū by setting:
Obviously,ū ∈ U π t,T . And we know β ǫ (ū) ≡ v ǫ , on [t, t j−1 ), and for s
, (from (4.35) and (4.36)) (4.38) which is in contradiction with (4.33). Therefore, (4.8) holds.
To prove Theorem 4.2 we only need to prove that for any ǫ > 0, there exists δ ǫ small enough satisfying that for any partition π = {0 = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t N = T } with |π| < δ ǫ and t = t k−1 , there is a pair (u ǫ , v ǫ ) satisfying the conditions of Theorem 4.1. For this we show a stronger result.
Proposition 4.1. For any ǫ > 0, there exists δ ǫ small enough satisfying that for any partition π = {0 = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t N = T } with |π| < δ ǫ and t = t k−1 , there exist a pair (u ǫ , v ǫ ) ∈ U π,1 t,T ×V π,1 t,T , such that, for any k ≤ i ≤ l ≤ N , and m = 1, 2, respectively,
Proof. Firstly, we show that when l = i, Proposition 4.1 holds. Similar to Lemma 4.3, we know for any ǫ > 0, there exists δ ǫ small enough satisfying that for any partition π = {0 = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t N = T } with |π| < δ ǫ and t = t k−1 , for any y ∈ R n there exist (u
For the partition π with |π| < δ ǫ , we now give the construction of (u ǫ , v ǫ ) ∈ U π,1
For i = k, from (4.45) we know there is (u we can consider the discrete case (with the strategies along the partition π) for some indiscrete zerosum differential games with asymmetric information. With this property, we provide a new method to calculate the value of the zero-sum differential games through considering all the partitions.
For simplicity, we only consider the case that Player I and II have no private information in a small time from beginning, then they observe each other and only know the opponent's probability, i.e., along with the partition π = {0 = t 0 < t 1 < . . . < t N = T }, t k−1 ≤ t < t k , the strategy α : Ω × [t, T ] × V t,T → U t,T of Player I has the following form
Obviously, the strategy α such defined is a special case of Definition 2.1, still denoted by A π (t, T ) for the set of the strategy α that have the above form. Similarly, we have the definition for the strategy β and for the set we still denoted by B π (t, T ). Obviously, for π ′ ⊂ π, we have A π ′ (t, T ) ⊂ A π (t, T ). A(t, T ) and B(t, T ) are the union of A π (t, T ) and B π (t, T ) with all partition π, respectively. It is noticed that the strategies used in this section have the above forms, the rest corresponding definitions are the same with that defined in Section 2.
To give the characterization, we introduce the following upper and lower value functions as followsW
Next we first prove (W π (t, x, p, q),V π (t, x, p, q)) and (W π (t, x, p, q),V π (t, x, p, q)) converge uniformly on compacts to the same couple (U (t, x, p, q), U (t, x, p, q)), as |π| → 0, under the condition 6) respectively, where
, and the function U (t, x, p, q) is the unique solution of the HJI equation (3.53). Then we show that the functions W (t, x, p, q) = U (t, x, p, q) = V (t, x, p, q) under the conditions (5.5) and (5.6).
Remark 5.1. The assumptions (5.5) and (5.6) hold, if and only if the following classical Isaacs condition holds: inf
Indeed, we have
If (5.5) and (5.6) hold, then we have
Then, we get classical Isaacs condition (5.7) holds. If (5.7) holds, then we have
then we know (5.5) holds. Similarly, we get (5.6).
Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.2, we get the following result.
Theorem 5.1. The functions (V πn ) and (W πn ) converge uniformly on compacts to a same Lipschitz continuous function U when the mesh of the partition π n tends to 0. Moreover, the function U is the unique dual viscosity solution of the HJI equation (3.53).
Now we only prove the convergence of (W π (t, x, p, q),V π (t, x, p, q)) and the proof of (W π (t, x, p, q),V π (t, x, p, q)) is similar.
Notice that for any fixed β ∈ B(t, T ), there exists some partitionπ such that β ∈ Bπ(t, T ). Using this technique and the method which have been used in Section 3, we have the following lemmas.
Lemma 5.1. The functionsW π andV π are Lipschitz continuous with respect to (t, x, p, q), uniformly with respect to π. Lemma 5.2. For any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n , the functionsW π (t, x, p, q) andV π (t, x, p, q) are convex in p and concave in q on ∆(I) × ∆(J), respectively.
)]}. Similar to the proof of Lemma 3.4, we havē
Since A π 0 (t, T ) ⊂ A π (t, T ), we haveV π * 1 (t, x,p, q) ≤V π * (t, x,p, q). Now we prove theV π * 1 (t, x,p, q) ≥ V π * (t, x,p, q). For any α ∈ A π (t, T ) , for any y = (y 1 , y 2 , ..., y 2(N −k)−1 ) ∈ R 2(N −k)−1 , it holds α(y, ·) ∈ A π 0 (t, T ). For any (β j ) ∈ (B(t, T )) J , we have the following inequalities Then taking infimum over (β j ) ∈ (B(t, T )) J on both side we get the desired result.
Lemma 5.4. For all the partition π of the interval [0, T ], the convex conjugate functionV π * (t, x,p, q) is Lipschitz with respect to (t, x,p, q), the concave conjugate functionW π# (t, x, p,q) is Lipschitz with respect to (t, x, p,q).
Lemma 5.5. For any (t, x,p, q) ∈ [t k−1 , t k ) × R n × R I × ∆(J), and for all l (k ≤ l ≤ N ), we havē For the proof of this lemma, we give the following remarks.
Remark 5.2. The proof of the first inequality is similar to Lemma 3.6 with the help of Lemma 5.3 and one should be noticed that α ∈ A π 0 (t, t l ) means α is a deterministic strategy. The second inequality is obviously since A π 0 (t, t l ) ⊂ A π (t, t l ). Lemma 5.7. The limit functionṼ (t, x,p, q) is a viscosity subsolution of the same HJI equation (3.38).
Notice that −W π (t, x, p, q) = sup Hence, the convex conjugate of (−W π ) with respect to q, i.e., −(W π# (t, x, p, −q)) satisfying a sub-dynamic programming principle. Then, we have the following lemma. where we takeα r =ũ k , r ∈ [t, t n k ],ũ k ∈ U . Define ρ n = (t n k − s n ) 2 , then from (5.20) there exists a ρ n -optimal strategy β n ∈ B(s n , t n k ) (depending onα r ) such that Since β n ∈ B(s n , t n k ) there is some partition π 0 , such that β n ∈ B π 0 (s n , t n k ), without loss of generality, π 0 ⊃ π n . Assume {s n = θ 0 < θ 1 < . . . < θ m = t n k } ⊂ π 0 . Therefore, (−f )(x n , u, v) · Dϕ(s n , x n )µ(du)ν(dv).
(5.27) Recall that (s n , x n ) → (t, x) and 0 ≤ (t n k − s n ) ≤ (t n k − t n k−1 ) ≤ |π n |, when n → ∞ we get ∂ϕ ∂t (t, x) + inf We assume π and π n as before, choose α r = 0, [t, t + |π n |]; β r−|πn| , [t + |π n |, T ];
, then we have J(t, x, α, β) = Obviously, the upper value function W (t, x) is not equal to the lower value function V (t, x) if we do not consider the conditions (5.5) and (5.6).
